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THE FUTURE OF FAST FOOD GOVERNANCE
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INTRODUCTION
The Fast Food Forward movement has swelled into one of the largest
protests by low-wage workers in U.S. history,1 animating efforts at all levels
of government to raise and enforce workplace standards.2 One such strategy
is to hold fast food franchisors accountable as joint employers of their
franchisees’ employees. In what may be a watershed moment, New York
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman (NYAG) recently filed suit against
Domino’s Pizza, the franchisor, for wage-and-hour-law violations in its
franchisees’ stores across New York State.3
† Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law. The author was a Section Chief
in the New York Attorney General’s Labor Bureau until June 2015. The views expressed in this Essay
are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of the Bureau or of the Office. The author is grateful
to Noah Zatz and Cynthia Estlund for invaluable guidance, to Kate Griffith, Catherine Ruckelshaus,
Naomi Sunshine, Patricia Kakalec, and James Tierney for their feedback on an earlier draft, and to Bing
Le and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, particularly Bill Seidleck and
Alexander Aiken, for excellent research assistance. All errors are the author’s.
1 See Steven Greenhouse & Jana Kasperkevic, Fight for $15 Swells into Largest Protest by Low-Wage
Workers in US History, GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/15/fightfor-15-minimum-wage-protests-new-york-los-angeles-atlanta-boston [https://perma.cc/8TX7-UCGB]
(discussing the nationwide fight to raise the minimum wage to fifteen dollars).
2 See Harry Bruinius, The Brewing Liberal Labor Revolution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 28,
2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2016/0628/The-brewing-liberal-labor-revolution [https://perma.cc/
5KZA-NVMK] (explaining how grassroots successes in the movement for higher wages have
catalyzed legislative efforts to improve labor laws).
3 Affirmation of Terri Gerstein in Support of Verified Petition, New York v. Domino’s Pizza,
Inc., No. 450627/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2016) [hereinafter Aff. Supp. V. Pet.]; see also Michelle
Chen, This Lawsuit Against Domino’s Could Be Huge for Workers, NATION (May 30, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/this-lawsuit-against-dominos-could-be-huge-for-workers [https://
perma.cc/CUL5-YCPS] (“According to a lawsuit filed by New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman’s office last week, the Domino’s pizza empire and its franchise operators share the
blame for years of cheating workers out of tipped wages and overtime pay. Both the parent company
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Fast food store employees report widespread wage-and-hour law
violations,4 and the NYAG’s Domino’s lawsuit appears to confirm this trend
within one of the largest fast food brands in the United States.5 The NYAG’s
suit is similar to successful nonfranchisor–franchisee wage-and-hour litigation,
where courts have assigned liability to lead firms because their subcontractors’
employees economically depend on them. But courts presented with similar
evidence in the franchisor–franchisee context have been reluctant to consider
franchisors to be joint employers.6 What accounts for this difference?
The purpose of this Essay is to provide one answer to this question. This
Essay argues that the franchise relationship is often misunderstood by the
judiciary as an arms-length relationship when, in fact, it is frequently
characterized by ongoing dependence.7 This is an important misapprehension
because dependence lies at the heart of how courts evaluate franchisor liability
under wage-and-hour and franchise laws. It leads many courts to assume
that the franchise agreement reflects an independent relationship between
franchisors and franchisees and to disregard the supervisory controls that
franchisors write into franchise agreements as routine quality standards.
The difference in judicial interpretations of the franchise relationship
relative to other contracting arrangements suggests that improving fast food
franchise store compliance with wage-and-hour law requires a reexamination
of the franchise relationship. The Essay explores the regulation of franchising
under wage-and-hour law and franchise law, finding that both legal regimes
create perverse incentives for franchisees to violate wage-and-hour law. This
Essay argues that improving wage-and-hour law compliance in franchise stores
will require a reconfiguration of the franchise relationship to incentivize

and the franchise operators are targeted as joint employers, charged with failing to adhere to
wage-and-hour laws for workers.”).
4 DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 130 (2014) [hereinafter WEIL, THE FISSURED
WORKPLACE] (“An estimated 18.2% of workers in the [fast food] sector experienced minimum wage
violations, 69.7% overtime violations, and 74.2% off-the-clock violations.”).
5 According to the NYAG’s Domino’s suit, all twelve of the investigated Domino’s franchisees
not named in the suit admitted violations of wage-and-hour laws. Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3,
¶¶ 34, 36, 40-45.
6 Compare Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Trans-Loading & Distrib., Inc., No. 2:11-8557, 2014 WL
183956, at *7-17 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014) (rejecting Wal-Mart’s argument that it was not a joint-employer
with its subcontractor under federal and state wage-and-hour laws based on evidence that Wal-Mart
may have exercised a significant degree of supervisory control), with Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No.
05-04534, 2007 WL 715488, at *3-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (denying a joint-employer claim against
a franchisor based on similar evidence contained in a franchise agreement).
7 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts,
42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 933-37 (1990) (noting that a franchisee typically “purchases or leases virtually
all of the franchised outlet’s capital equipment,” relies on the franchisor’s “trademark and business
format,” and “pay[s] ongoing royalties to the franchisor”).
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franchisor monitoring of franchisee pay practices, notwithstanding the
franchisor’s joint-employer status.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I explores the franchise relationship,
finding that franchising permits national fast food companies to centralize their
operations through comprehensive operational standards that franchisees must
follow at the risk of losing their investment in the franchise, creating
dependency that can cause wage-and-hour-law violations. Part II examines
the regulation of the franchise relationship under wage-and-hour and franchise
laws. It explains why courts tend to be more skeptical about joint-employer
claims in franchising arrangements than other types of contracting
arrangements. Specifically, it argues that this skepticism is grounded in an
incorrect assumption that franchise agreements are arms-length transactions.
This permits franchisors to avoid joint-employer liability by characterizing
supervisory control as a more generic form of quality control. Part III briefly
explores the claims of the NYAG’s Domino’s lawsuit and explains why
franchisors may respond with superficial changes to the franchise agreement
instead of measures to improve franchisee compliance with the law. Finally,
the Conclusion summarizes the implications of this analysis by identifying
two routes to incentivize franchisors to monitor pay practices in franchise
stores: (a) through wage-and-hour law, with deep factual records of
franchising relationships to overcome the present judicial skepticism of
franchisee dependency; and (b) through fraud and franchise laws, by
imposing a duty on franchisors to ensure wage-and-hour law compliance in
franchise stores, notwithstanding their joint-employer status.
I. FAST FOOD FRANCHISING TO CENTRALIZE OPERATIONS
THROUGH FRANCHISEE DEPENDENCE
Franchising is a large and growing business model in the United States.8
Fast food stores are overwhelmingly operated by franchisees. Domino’s, for
example, reports that over 90% of its 5273 domestic stores are franchise-owned,
from which it collects over a quarter billion dollars in annual revenue.9
Franchising is also a dominant operational form in a variety of other low-wage
industries, including home health care, the janitorial industry, and hotels.10

8 See Robert W. Emerson, Assessing Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc.: The Franchisee as
a Dependent Contractor, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 203, 210-11 (2014) (noting that in the United States
franchising accounts “for roughly 40% of all retail sales, with approximately 757,453 operating
franchised units directly employing about 8.3 million people and . . . . yield[ing] about 1.5 trillion
dollars in annual retail sales” (footnotes omitted)).
9 Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3, ¶ 18.
10 WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 4, at 122-42 (discussing franchising in fast
food, janitorial services, car rentals, hotels, and home health care).
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Franchising permits national firms that operate through a geographically
dispersed network of workplaces in the service economy to efficiently centralize
operations, while controlling the costs of expanding store operations.11
Franchising accomplishes this by shifting the cost of store operations to
franchisees while imposing comprehensive operational standards that
franchisees must follow to preserve their investment in the franchise.12
A. Fast Food Franchising
Fast food franchisors build dependence into their franchise agreements,
beginning with their unequal bargaining position. National fast food brands
are among the largest and most sophisticated firms in the United States,13
while their typical entering franchisees have little or no previous business
experience and operate only one or two franchise stores.14 Franchisors extend
this initially superior bargaining position into the franchise relationship with
incomplete contract terms that shift risk to franchisees and leave the
11 See DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC
ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 41-44 (2010) [hereinafter WEIL,
STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT] (“Franchising is also an attractive ownership form given the [fast
food] industry’s geographically dispersed, labor-intensive, and service-based nature. In such an
industry, an enterprise’s profitability is closely tied to the productivity and service delivery of its
workforce. Assuring workforce productivity, in turn, requires effective management, including
careful monitoring of the workplace. A large company with geographically dispersed outlets can
therefore use franchising—rather than relying on company-owned and managed outlets—to better
align the incentives of the franchisee, whose earnings are linked to the outlet’s profitability.”); WEIL,
THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 4, at 122-29 (discussing how franchises can maintain a
strong brand and minimize labor costs while expanding across wide geographic areas).
12 See Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1503, 1509 (1990) (“Because the franchise contract usually is determined by the franchisor via a
standard form agreement, . . . most of the express contractual obligations fall upon the franchisee.”);
David J. Kaufmann, An Overview of the Business and Law of Franchising 2 (Aspatore, 2013 WL 3773409,
2013) (“[T]he entire expense of developing, opening, and operating a franchised unit—buying or
leasing the real estate, erecting and equipping the business premises, hiring and paying all personnel,
paying for all inventory, and being financially liable for all aspects of that unit—is typically borne
solely by the franchisee.”).
13 In 2014, 104 of the top five hundred franchising firms in the United States were in the fast
food sector, the largest number of any sector. See Tracy Stapp Herold, The Fastest-Growing Sectors in the
Franchise Industry, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/240720
[https://perma.cc/HR5Y-C6JY] (“The biggest sector by far, quick-service restaurants comprise more
than 20 percent of the Franchise 500®.”).
14 See Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting the Debate
over Franchise Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193, 213-14 (2013) (reviewing empirical research
and concluding that typical franchisees lack business experience and fail to read or understand the
terms of franchise agreements); Kimberly A. Morrison, An Empirical Test of a Model of Franchisee Job
Satisfaction, 34 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 27, 30 (1996) (noting that “only 20 percent of the sample had
actually been business owners before becoming franchisees”); Elizabeth Garone, The New Face of
Franchisees, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324021104
578553580349491440 [https://perma.cc/LEX4-Z8KR] (showing that 81% of franchisees own only one unit).
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franchisors’ duties to franchisees undefined.15 Franchisees must pay an initial
fee, often in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and purchase all store
equipment and materials.16 Fast food franchisors also expressly incorporate
their operational standards in the franchise agreement and reserve the right
to terminate the agreements of franchisees who they determine have not met
these standards.17 In contrast to the franchisees’ extensive obligations,
franchisors in franchise agreements offer only vague commitments to provide
operational advice and guidance at the franchisors’ discretion.18
Franchisors can thereby centralize operations with standards that
routinize every part of the work required to operate a franchise store, subject
to unilateral change by the franchisor.19 Franchisors can track and monitor
these performance metrics through required franchisee computer
equipment.20 Detailed operational requirements also permit franchisors to
deskill and routinize management functions by setting detailed hiring and
firing standards that delegate little supervisory discretion and by conducting
employee trainings remotely through their required computer systems.21
However, unlike directly employed managers, franchisees have an interest
in ignoring operational standards that impose costs on franchise stores because
15 See, e.g., Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3, ¶ 20 (noting that the Domino’s “Franchise
Agreement requires franchisees ‘to fully comply with all specifications, standards and operating
procedures and rules from time to time prescribed for the operation of a Domino’s Pizza Store’”);
see also id. ¶ 22 (summarizing other features of the Domino’s Franchise Agreement); Hadfield, supra
note 7, at 945 (“By 1977, the obligations of McDonald’s franchisees were even more detailed. This
contract ostensibly limited the parties’ intent to ensuring the franchisee’s compliance with those
obligations, rather than to creating a set of mutual commitments. . . . In contrast, the contract left
the franchisor’s duties relatively undefined, a difficult-to-quantify duty to ‘advise and consult.’”).
16 See Hadfield, supra note 7, at 934-35 (demonstrating that fast food franchisee fees may often
exceed $100,000); see also Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3, ¶ 22(a) (specifying that one of the terms
of the Domino’s Franchise Agreement is setting the “fees franchisees must pay to Domino’s”).
17 Hadfield, supra note 7, at 970.
18 Id. at 945. According to the franchise agreement annexed in the NYAG Domino’s suit,
Domino’s offers franchisees operating and marketing assistance, but only at its discretion and
without assuming any responsibility for the franchisees’ success. See Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3,
at Ex. 18 (illustrating the imbalance of power between franchisors and franchisees).
19 See Hadfield, supra note 7, at 945 (explaining that by the 1970s, McDonald’s had incorporated
adherence to its entire Operations Manual as express terms of the contract). Domino’s requires
franchise stores to follow a nearly 800-page manual of rules. Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3, ¶ 23
n.6. One state appellate court called this manual “a veritable bible for overseeing a Domino’s
operation. . . . [That] literally leaves nothing to chance.” Parker v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 629 So. 2d
1026, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
20 According to the NYAG’s Domino’s suit, the moment a franchise store employee logs an
order in the system, Domino’s begins a timer that measures each step of the process against its own
benchmarks. Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3, ¶¶ 183-87.
21 Domino’s allegedly requires franchisees to reject applicants and fire employees who do not
meet Domino’s criminal background and motor-vehicle standards, and it trains franchise store
managers to defeat unionization campaigns and to use its payroll software to lower labor expenses.
Id. ¶¶ 137-46, 165-66.
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franchisees may only recoup their investments in the franchise if the business
is profitable.22 Fast food franchisors address this incentive by monitoring
franchisees extensively for compliance with operational standards and by
terminating the franchise agreements of those who do not comply with these
standards.23 The franchisor’s unilateral right to terminate a franchise agreement
is a catastrophic threat to franchisees, particularly those who are undercapitalized
or who have no significant work experience outside the franchise.
B. The Perverse Incentives of Franchisee Dependency
Commentators have criticized franchise law for permitting franchisors to
opportunistically require exhaustive contractual specifications and impose
draconian remedies for noncompliance without a corresponding obligation by
franchisors to exercise reasonableness and good faith.24 In the words of the
former United States Department of Labor (DOL) Wage and Hour Division
Administrator David Weil, franchisor opportunism can also “create incentives
for franchisees to violate laws.”25 Franchisors condition the franchise
agreement on all manner of operations except wage rates.26 Since franchisors
aggressively police nearly all other cost variables, suppressing employee wages
is one of the few ways that franchisees can boost store profit by cutting costs.

22 See Hadfield, supra note 7, at 950 (“A franchisee wants to maximize her profits from the
operation of the outlet; she does not wish to undertake any efforts or expenditures that will not
compensate the undertaking.”); MinWoong Ji & David Weil, The Impact of Franchising on Labor
Standards Compliance, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 977, 979-82 (2015) (arguing that “franchisees are
more likely not to comply with labor standards regulations than comparable restaurants owned by
franchisors” because they are less likely to be caught, as they own fewer establishments, and that they
“will always receive a lower profit per unit than a comparable company-owned establishment” because
of owing the franchise fee, and they have less stake in the brand and “face lower incentives to pay an
efficiency wage and greater incentive to directly supervise workers who may be of lower productivity”).
23 See Peter C. Lagarias, Franchising in California: Uniformity in California Franchise Agreements,
21 FRANCHISE L.J. 136, 138 (2002) (noting that franchise agreements include termination clauses
that permit termination for failing to meet the franchisor’s standards, violating the franchise
agreement or violating any law, statute, or violation); Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling
Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 198-216 (2004) (describing
complaints by franchisees of onerous inspection requirements and unjustified franchise
terminations). According to testimony by a Domino’s representative and Domino’s business records,
it reserves the right to terminate the franchise agreement of any franchisee who does “anything that
would reflect poorly” on the brand. Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3, ¶ 23. It has terminated
approximately fifty franchise agreements in New York State over a four-year period. Id. ¶ 176.
24 See Hadfield, supra note 7, at 950-55 (describing the “opportunism” problem created by
incomplete terms in the franchise contract); Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 23, at 178-81 (reviewing
the interplay of antitrust law and franchises and concluding that, “[u]nconstrained by principles of
antitrust or agency, franchisors are free to take opportunistic advantage of franchisees . . . .”).
25 WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 4, at 9.
26 See Lagarias, supra note 23, at 137-38 (discussing various franchise obligations and provisions
included in typical franchise agreements without mentioning wage rate requirements).
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Studies have shown that franchising is correlated with wage-and-hour law
violations in fast food stores. David Weil, comparing DOL investigations of
fast food franchisee– and franchisor-owned stores, found that “[t]he
probability of noncompliance is about 24% higher among franchisee-owned
outlets than among otherwise similar company-owned outlets.”27 This finding
is consistent with the allegation in the NYAG’s Domino’s suit that most
franchisees in New York State report wage rates to Domino’s that violate
wage-and-hour laws. 28
The franchisor’s incentive to impose operational requirements without a
corresponding obligation to act in the franchisees’ benefit can cause these
violations. Domino’s, for example, allegedly provides franchisees with a
“Payroll Report” that automatically calculates owed wages to use for payroll.29
But, according to the NYAG’s Domino’s suit, this Payroll Report
systematically underreports wages owed to franchise store employees.30 It is
allegedly “impossible” for a franchisee to know that the Payroll Report
underreports owed wages because it only provides gross owed wages without
showing the underlying calculations.31 Domino’s has allegedly been aware of
flaws in the Payroll Report since 2007 but did not fix the flaws or inform the
franchisees about them.32
It is difficult to imagine a franchisor allowing its own store managers to
use a flawed payroll system that underreported owed wages. That Domino’s
allegedly allowed its franchisees to do so for nearly a decade demonstrates the
need for greater franchisor accountability.

27 WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 4, at 131-32; see also MinWoong Ji & David
Weil, Does Ownership Structure Influence Regulatory Behavior? The Impact of Franchising on Labor
Standards Compliance 3 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2010-21, 2009) (noting that
investigations have found on average $4,265 more back wages owed at franchise stores than at
comparable company-owned outlets on average).
28 Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3, ¶ 34.
29 Id. ¶¶ 91-118. Domino’s alleges that it has recently restricted access to the Payroll Report for
franchisees in New York State. Memorandum in Opposition to Verified Petition at 13, People v.
Domino’s Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2016).
30 Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3, ¶¶ 91-118. According to the NYAG’s Domino’s suit, the Payroll
Report contains flaws that cause it to report owed wages that violate federal and state wage-and-hour
law in (1) underreporting owed overtime for those employees who work in more than one franchise
store; (2) underreporting the overtime wages owed to delivery employees whose franchisees claim a
“tip credit” by multiplying 1.5 times the reduced, tipped rate, instead of the minimum wage; and (3)
failing to track nontipped work when the franchisee claims a tip credit. Id. ¶¶ 99-111.
31 Id. ¶ 197.
32 Id. ¶¶ 98-114.
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II. DEFEATING FRANCHISOR ACCOUNTABILITY BY CHARACTERIZING
SUPERVISORY CONTROL AS QUALITY CONTROL
Where labor contractors and their employees in low-wage industries
economically depend upon a lead firm for work, the lead firm can be held
liable as a joint employer.33 But historically, courts have been reluctant to find
that franchisors jointly employ franchise employees. This is anomalous
because the economic dependence of the franchisee’s employees is not
functionally different from employees of any other labor contractor. A review
of joint-employer claims against fast food franchisors reveals that this
anomaly stems from the incorrect assumption that a franchise agreement is
arms-length. This assumption permits franchisors to sweep supervisory
control into franchise agreements by characterizing supervision as
“operational” or “quality” control to defeat franchisor joint-employer claims.
Dependency defines the outer boundary of franchisor responsibility for
franchise store employees; it separates independent contractor relationships
from employee status under wage-and-hour laws and true arms-length
transactions from ones of trust, in which a heightened duty is owed.34 But
despite the dependency woven into the franchise relationship, courts
considering franchise law and joint-employer claims historically have greeted
claims of franchisor supervisory control with skepticism.35
Franchise law does not impose a special duty on franchisors outside of
requiring good faith in franchise terminations,36 which cannot override the
express provisions of a franchise agreement.37 Most courts find that this duty is
met so long as the franchisor discloses all known, material terms in the franchise
agreement and exercises good faith in its exercise of franchise termination
provisions.38 In effect, absent fraud or bad faith in franchise termination, the
33
34
MICH.

See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Standard Approach, 2013
ST. L. REV. 641, 668-71 (noting that a franchisee’s dependency upon the franchisor can
establish a fiduciary duty); Julia Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of
the Means/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. REV. 315, 334 (2014) (explaining how, in
deciding whether an employee–employer relationship exists, many courts ask “whether the worker
or contractor is ‘economically dependent’ on the alleged employer”).
35 See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
36 See Boat & Motor Mart v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 825 F.2d 1285, 1292 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The
California Franchise Relations Act has not imposed additional fiduciary duties on the franchisor.”);
Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 354-56 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that the franchisor
owed no fiduciary duty to the franchisee outside of termination); cf. Arnott v. Am. Oil Co., 609 F.2d
873, 881-84 (8th Cir. 1979) (reasoning that “[i]nherent in a franchise relationship is a fiduciary duty,”
but describing that duty as merely requiring good faith and fair dealing).
37 Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of Care Toward Its
Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 929 (1994).
38 See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 741-43 (Pa. 1978) (holding that franchisors
may not terminate franchise agreements arbitrarily but otherwise owe no special duty to franchisees).
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franchise relationship is governed by the franchise agreement, in which
franchisors can disclaim all responsibility for franchisee employees.39
Wage-and-hour laws are a different story, or they should be. The Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA),40 like New York Labor Law and many other
state wage-and-hour laws, broadly defines the employment relationship as
one in which a person or entity “suffer[s]” or “permit[s]” an individual to
work,41 and an employee may have multiple employers who are jointly
responsible for wage-and-hour-law compliance.42 The “striking breadth”43 of
this definition is meant to protect vulnerable workers by extending liability
to the lead firms on which the employees economically depend.44 Under wageand-hour laws, courts assign liability to joint employers where the “economic
reality” shows that the employee is dependent on the putative joint employer.45
Courts have applied this doctrine in a variety of industries to assign
liability to lead firms as joint employers despite a lack of direct supervision.
For example, the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine to the agriculture
industry in Torres-Lopez v. May,46 and the Second Circuit did the same to the
garment industry in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.47 In addition to the extent of
direct control, such as on-site supervision and assigning wage rates, these
courts have reviewed evidence of joint employment across two additional
dimensions: (1) indirect supervision over the employee, such as supervisory
39 Domino’s, for example, opposes the NYAG’s claims of franchisee dependence by reference
to the franchise agreement, which characterizes franchisees as “independent contractor[s]” who can,
subject to compliance with the terms of the franchise agreement, “operate their stores as they see
fit” and are solely responsible for compliance with the law. Memorandum in Opposition to Verified
Petition, supra note 29, at 5-6.
40 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
41 Id. § 203(g). Many state laws, including New York Labor Law, define the employment
relationship in a similarly broad manner. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.14(a)
(“Employee means any individual employed, suffered or permitted to work by an employer, except as
provided below.”).
42 29 U.S.C. § 203(d); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2016).
43 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992).
44 See Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d 403, 405, 408 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that
migrant workers of a subcontractor—who were “furnished only dilapidated and overcrowded housing”
and were “not fully compensate[d]”—were also employees, under the FLSA, of the seed company that
had contracted with the subcontractor); Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the
Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983,
1043-48, 1094-99 (1999) (tracing the origins of the “suffer” and “permit” language to early twentieth
century laws meant to protect a particularly vulnerable class—child laborers).
45 See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1947) (finding that a
slaughterhouse jointly employed de-boners—despite labeling them as independent contractors—because
of its occasional supervision of the de-boners, evidence that the de-boners depended on the
slaughterhouse for their schedules and income, and their performance of routine line-jobs that the
slaughterhouse integrated into its production process).
46 111 F.3d 633, 645 (9th Cir. 1997).
47 355 F.3d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 2003).
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control embedded in operational standards; and (2) nonsupervisory
dependence, or evidence of economic dependence separate from supervision,
such as the extent to which an employee performs routine, unskilled work
that is integrated into the production process. For instance, the Ninth Circuit
in Torres-Lopez found that a grower jointly employed pickers because it
controlled the harvest schedule and total workers needed, owned the premises
and equipment, permitted the contract to pass from one labor contractor to
the next with no material changes, the workers had no business organization
that shifted from one unit to another, and the work—picking cucumbers—was
integral to the production process.48 Similarly, the Second Circuit in Zheng
vacated a trial court’s determination that a garment manufacturer did not
jointly employ its labor contractor’s employees because it failed to consider
evidence of indirect supervision and nonsupervisory dependency.49
Following this and similar precedent, lower courts have considered indirect
supervision and nonsupervisory dependence in joint-employer claims under
wage-and-hour law in a variety of industries.50 In one recent and illustrative
FLSA case, the Central District of California denied Wal-Mart’s partial motion
for summary judgment in Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Trans-Loading &
Distribution, Inc., finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether Wal-Mart
jointly employed the employee of a warehouse operator where there was little
evidence of direct control.51 Specifically, the court found that Wal-Mart
indirectly supervised the warehouse operator through “operating metrics,”
including specific productivity goals for each hour of work, suggestions about
how to improve the efficiency of the work, and detailed audits that, if they
revealed deficiencies, required the warehouse operator to provide a written
action plan along with corrective action.52
In contrast to this line of subcontractor cases, courts considering FLSA claims
against franchisors often reject indirect supervision and nonsupervisory
dependence as grounds for a joint-employer determination. In Singh v. 7-Eleven,
Inc., for example, another California federal court held that employees of a
franchise convenience store were not jointly employed by the franchisor.53
The Fifth Circuit in Orozco v. Plackis discounted indirect supervision by
48
49
50

111 F.3d at 640-41.
355 F.3d at 70-72.
See, e.g., Greenawalt v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 642 F. App’x 36, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2016) (vacating
judgment that dismissed a joint-employer claim by security guards); Velez v. New Haven Bus Serv.,
Inc., No. 3:13-19, 2015 WL 75361, at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 6, 2015) (denying defendant Yale University
summary judgment on a claim that it jointly employs bus drivers); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s
Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting summary judgment to delivery
workers, finding that a pharmacy jointly employed them).
51 No. 2:11-8557, 2014 WL 183956, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).
52 Id. at *3-4.
53 No. 05-4534, 2007 WL 715488, at *3-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007).
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holding in favor of a fast food franchisor in a joint-employer FLSA claim.54
In Reese v. Coastal Restoration and Cleaning Services, Inc., a Mississippi federal
court dismissed evidence of indirect supervision and rejected a franchisor
joint-employer claim in the janitorial industry.55
In each of these cases, the courts rejected evidence of indirect supervision
similar to evidence found sufficient to establish a joint-employer relationship in
Carrillo. The courts in Orozco, Reese, and Singh minimized the required selection,
supervision, and training standards similar to those found probative of indirect
supervision in Carrillo.56 Whereas the court in Carrillo found that Wal-Mart’s
“suggestions” to improve the warehouse operation evidenced nonsupervisory
dependence because of the expectation that the operator would follow the
recommendations,57 Orozco merely found irrelevant, “non-binding” advice.58
What accounts for this difference? Employment scholars have offered
different theories to explain the inconsistent outcomes reached by courts
considering employment status controversies. Marc Linder criticizes the
judiciary’s failure to consider FLSA’s remedial statutory purpose, which leads
courts to apply various factors formalistically instead of searching the record
to discern the economic reality of the work relationship.59 Katherine Stone
locates this resistance to change in the nature of work itself, finding that the
traditional factors showing economic dependence in industrialized work
settings do not translate well into a post-industrial work relationship.60
To be sure, statutory purposelessness and confusion about how to apply a
doctrine developed in the 1940s to post-industrial work relations helps to
54
55
56

757 F.3d 445, 449-52 (5th Cir. 2014).
No 1:10-36, 2010 WL 5184841, at *3-5 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010).
See Orozco, 757 F.3d at 451-52 (concluding that a franchisor did not supervise or control its
franchisee’s work schedule and conditions, despite evidence that the franchisor trained employees,
and further concluding that a provision in the franchise agreement requiring the franchisee to meet
the franchisor’s standards did not suffice to establish indirect control); Reese, 2010 WL 5184841, at
*4 (concluding that a franchisor did not exercise authority in hiring and firing employees, despite
the franchisor’s background-check requirement, and that the franchisor did not exercise supervision
and control of the work schedule and conditions, despite a provision in the franchise license
agreement requiring “vehicles, equipment, supplies, cleaning products, uniforms, computer
hardware and software” to meet the franchisor’s standards); Singh, 2007 WL 715488, at *3
(concluding that the franchisor was not a joint employer, despite evidence that “employees were
subject to the terms and conditions of the training, on-going training, and satisfaction of 7-Eleven
service standards,” the franchisor imposed various operational standards on the store, and the
franchisor provided payroll services).
57 Carillo, 2014 WL 183956, at *8.
58 Orozco, 757 F.3d at 449; see also Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1238 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (discounting McDonald’s staffing “advice” to store managers outside the franchisee’s presence).
59 Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous
Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 187, 207-08 (1999).
60 Katherine V.W. Stone, Rethinking Labour Law: Employment Protections for Boundaryless
Workers, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW 155, 162-75 (Guy Davidov & Brian
Langille eds., 2006).
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account for the malleability of the FLSA joint-employer test. Some courts
have narrowly construed the joint-employer doctrine for jobs that cannot be
easily analogized to the mass production work of the industrial era,61 while
other courts, including the court in Carrillo, have grounded their broad
application of the joint-employer doctrine in the industrial nature of the
work.62 But the failure to consider statutory purpose does not explain why
the joint-employer doctrine is consistently applied more narrowly in the
franchising context. Jobs performed by fast food workers are as analogous to
industrial work as those jobs performed by agricultural, garment, and
warehousing workers. In these latter cases, courts have broadly applied the
economic realities test. Not so in the franchising context.
The courts’ consideration of indirect supervision in Torres-Lopez, Zheng,
and Carrillo but not in franchising cases like Orozco, Reese, and Singh appears
grounded primarily in the mistaken assumption that the franchise relationship
is an arms-length transaction. This assumption pervades franchising cases,
extending well beyond wage-and-hour law. “Franchising is different,” reasoned
the California Supreme Court in Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC,63 a state
sexual harassment case, because “[t]he franchisee is often an entrepreneurial
individual who is willing to invest his time and money, and to assume the risk
of loss, in order to own and profit from his own business.”64 The franchise
agreement, accordingly, reflects an arms-length relationship that seeks to
establish uniform quality standards “for the benefit of both parties.”65 As
explained in Part I, this assumption is incorrect: franchisees are generally not
independent entrepreneurs but rather dependent contractors. As a result, the
franchise agreement is often an incomplete contract that primarily benefits
the franchisor. And this incorrect assumption can lead courts to dismiss the

61 See, e.g., In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir.
2012) (applying only direct control factors to a joint-employer claim by a car rental company’s sales managers).
62 In Carrillo, for example, the court reasoned that “the manual labor performed by plaintiffs . . . is
sufficiently analogous to the [agricultural] labor in Torres-Lopez such that the combined application of
the [indirect supervision and nonsupervisory dependency] factors is appropriate.” 2014 WL 183956, at
*11; see also Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding agricultural
workers to be jointly employed by a seed company and a labor contractor because “[e]verything the
Court said” about work performed by deboners in Rutherford is true about plaintiffs’ work); Ansoumana
v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that a pharmacy
jointly employed delivery workers because their work was sufficiently analogous to work performed by
deboners in Rutherford, as well as agricultural and garment workers in other cases).
63 333 P.3d 723 (Cal. 2014).
64 Id. at 732, 734. The state law claim in Patterson differs from most wage-and-hour laws in
requiring a showing of day-to-day supervision to sustain a joint-employer finding. Id. at 740.
65 Id. at 738. Domino’s relies on the reasoning in Patterson to argue that “the implementation
and enforcement of [quality control] standards does not make a franchisor a joint employer.”
Memorandum in Opposition to Verified Petition, supra note 29, at 17.
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supervisory authority reserved to the franchisor in the franchise agreement
as a form of quality control.66
Julia Tomassetti makes a related critique of the test for determining
employment or independent contractor status, distinguishing between
control over the means of the work and control over the end result.67 For
Tomassetti, the flaw in this test is that, unlike in a standard contract,
performance is never complete in an employment agreement.68 As a result,
all terms can point toward either control over the means or ends. Contractual
nonrenewal rights, for example, can either constitute evidence of a right to
discipline—which shows an employment relationship—or the completion of
a contract term—which shows an independent contractor agreement. In
conflating the means of production with its end, courts fail to find a
distinction with a difference.69
The courts in Singh, Reese, and Orozco evoked a similarly empty distinction
between supervisory and quality controls in the franchise agreement. Each of
these courts discounted evidence of supervisory control that served the
franchisor’s interest in operational, or quality, control.70 These cases, then,
66 See Patterson, 333 P.3d at 739 (dismissing evidence other than direct control because “[a]ny other
guiding principle would disrupt the franchise relationship”); see also, e.g., Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp.,
133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1235-39 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (disregarding “the welter of” facts showing McDonald’s
“strength as a franchisor”—including its power to unilaterally sanction the franchisee and terminate the
franchise agreement, give “recommendations” about “crew scheduling and staffing,” utilize extensive
monitoring, require training, and use scheduling and payroll programs—as evidence of an employment
relationship); Vann v. Massage Envy Franchising LLC, 13-2221, 2015 WL 74139, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6,
2015) (discounting evidence of franchisor control over franchise store services and customer interactions
as “policies to assist in brand uniformity”); Reese v. Coastal Restoration & Cleaning Servs., Inc., No
1:10-36, 2010 WL 5184841, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010) (noting that a contractual provision in the
franchise agreement “is simply one of the quality control standards” imposed by the franchisor and that
it “does not show that [the franchisor] has power to control hiring/firing of [franchisee] employees”).
Although the Second Circuit in Zheng distinguished between supervisory and quality control, it held
that purported quality control that affects employee schedules is a form of supervisory control. See 355
F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]n cases in which the purported joint employees worked exclusively or
predominantly for the purported joint employer. . . . [T]he joint employer may de facto become
responsible, among other things, for the amount workers are paid and for their schedules, which are
traditional indicia of employment.”).
67 Tomassetti, supra note 34, at 336-39, 357-62. As demonstrated by a recent Ninth Circuit case,
this test is intended to distinguish bona fide independent contractor relationships, which only
impose requirements on the end product or service, from those permitting control over the manner
in which the work is performed. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981,
989-90, 993 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that FedEx employed drivers that it labeled independent
contractors because it not only controlled the “results” of customer deliveries but also the means,
including driver appearance standards and schedules).
68 Tomassetti, supra note 34, at 355-56.
69 Id. at 356-57.
70 See Reese, 2010 WL 5184841, at *4 (finding that a background check “is simply one of the quality
control standards [the franchisor] requires as a condition to granting a franchise for the use of its system,
trade name, service marks, trademarks, etc.”); Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 05-04534, 2007 WL 715488,
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appear to turn on whether this dependence serves the interest of franchisors
rather than the degree of dependence by the franchisees’ employees on the
franchisors. This is circular reasoning. Franchisors have an interest in all
manners of franchisee dependence on the franchisor, including dependence
achieved through indirect supervision of franchise store employees. By
sweeping supervisory control into the franchise agreement under the guise of
an arms-length agreement, franchisors have succeeded in persuading courts
that dependence suggesting joint employment is somehow a mutually
exclusive category from dependence in controlling operations.71
At its logical endpoint, this reasoning serves as a threshold test for
whether to consider indirect supervision and franchisee dependence at all. In
Juarez, one California trial court made this often-unstated test explicit,
holding that the state’s presumption of employment in its means–ends test
“does not apply in the franchise context” and instead requiring the franchisee
to “show that the franchisor exercised control beyond that necessary to protect
and maintain its interest in its trademark, trade name, and goodwill to
establish a prima facie case of an employer–employee relationship.”72
As the Third Circuit recently held in rejecting the reasoning in Juarez,
this franchising supervisory control–quality control distinction has no basis
in law.73 Moreover, as the Second Circuit in Zheng observed, it creates
incentives for joint employers to hide behind formal trappings of
independence to disguise a joint-employment relationship.74 This incentive
is particularly perverse in fast food franchise stores, where franchisee
dependence on the franchisor can cause wage-and-hour-law violations.

at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (determining that supervisory controls meeting the franchisor’s “goal of
attaining conformity to certain operational standards and details” did not create an employer–employee
relationship); see also Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2014) (reading the franchise
agreement to grant the franchisor “a certain degree of control over the [franchisee’s] location,” but
holding such control insufficient to make the franchisor an employer of franchisee’s staff).
71 Domino’s, for example, relies on the supervisory control–quality control distinction to argue
that “the [NY]AG’s claim that [Domino’s] is a ‘joint employer’ impermissibly attempts to transform
the standards that [Domino’s] (and every other franchisor) uses to protect its brand and ensure
consistency and quality into indicia of an employment relationship.” Memorandum in Opposition
to Verified Petition, supra note 29, at 17.
72 Juarez v. Jani-King of Cal., Inc., No. 09-3495, 2012 WL 177564, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012)
(internal quotations omitted); see also Courtland v. GCEP-Surprise, LLC, CV-12-00349, 2013 WL
3894981, at *3 (July 29, 2013) (relying on Patterson to reject indirect supervision as evidence of a
franchisor’s joint employment of franchise store employees, holding that “[a] franchisor is not a joint
employer unless it has significant control over the employment relationship”).
73 See Williams v. Jani-King of Phila. Inc., No. 15-2049, 2016 WL 5111920, at *7 (3d Cir. Sept. 21,
2016) (“Pennsylvania law does not distinguish between controls put in place to protect a franchise’s
goodwill and intellectual property and controls for other purposes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
74 See 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the factors pertinent to an FLSA analysis where
alleged joint-employers are attempting “to evade the FLSA or other labor laws”).
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III. NEW YORK ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DOMINO’S LAWSUIT AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR FAST FOOD GOVERNANCE
The NYAG’s Domino’s suit introduces evidence of franchisee dependence
on Domino’s and the franchisor’s aggressive monitoring of comprehensive
operational standards to supervise its franchise store workforce indirectly. If
this were the extent of its allegations, this case would risk the same judicial
skepticism that greeted the plaintiffs in Orozco, Singh, and Reese. But the
allegations in the NYAG’s Domino’s suit also describe direct interventions by
Domino’s in the hiring, supervision, discipline, and termination decisions in
franchise stores, including that Domino’s required franchisees to use software
it knew systematically underreported owed wages.75 If credited by a court,
these allegations seem sufficient to establish a joint-employer relationship, as
several lower courts have recently denied franchisor motions to dismiss jointemployer claims with similar allegations.76
Even if these allegations were insufficient, the NYAG additionally asserts
that Domino’s alleged failure to correct or disclose the flaws in its payroll
program violate both fraud and franchise law statutes.77 Importantly, a court
could reject the claim that Domino’s is a joint employer of franchise store
employees and still find violations of state fraud and franchise law. This
outcome would require Domino’s to remedy these violations of wage-andhour law.

75
76

Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 3, ¶¶ 133-61, 180-207.
See, e.g., Ocampo v. 455 Hospitality LLC, No. 14-9614, 2016 WL 4926204, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 2016) (denying a franchisor’s motion to dismiss hotel employees’ joint-employer wage-andhour-law claim based on allegations that the franchisor monitored employee performance through
on-site inspections, required employee time and wage recordkeeping, instructed franchisees on how
to hire and train employees, and reserved right to audit franchisee records and terminate franchise
agreement based on inspection results); Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13-5665, 2014 WL 3512838, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) (denying a franchisor-defendant’s motion to dismiss where the franchiseeemployee alleged, in part, that the franchisor required “certain record keeping systems, including
systems for tracking hours and wages and for retaining payroll records and therefore, that [the
franchisor] knew or should have known of, and had the authority to exercise control over, the
accuracy of records concerning Plaintiffs’ hours and wages and those of similarly situated
employees”); Olvera v. Bareburger Group LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding
that franchise restaurant employees pleaded sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss where the
complaint “asserts, inter alia, that the franchisor-defendants: (1) guided franchisees on ‘how to hire
and train employees’; (2) set and enforced requirements for the operation of franchises; (3)
monitored employee performance . . . .”); Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(holding that plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss where their complaint
alleged, for example, that franchisor-defendants “created management and operation policies and
practices that were implemented at the defendants’ store . . . and monitor[ed] employee performance
by means of required computer hardware and software”).
77 Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Verified Petition at 36-41, People v. Domino’s
Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2016).
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Even if the NYAG prevails in its suit against Domino’s, however, it is
unclear whether it will establish a broad, durable baseline of franchisor
accountability. Franchisors are likely to resist monitoring franchise store pay
practices for fear of expanding their liability to other employment laws and
tort claims.78 Franchisors can seek to insulate themselves from legal liability
by reconfiguring their relations with franchisees. For example, franchisors
could require franchisees to operate more independently of the franchisor, yet
increase the capital investment requirement to ensure their dependency on the
franchise relationship. Or, franchisors could shift the risk of joint-employer
liability to a third party by subcontracting out their franchising operation.
Franchisors could also avoid fraud and franchise law liability by removing
franchise store payroll functions and data from their required software.79
These measures would not remove the perverse incentives for franchisees to
violate wage-and-hour laws, or for franchisors to ignore these laws while still
imposing comprehensive operational standards. Indeed, by removing franchisors
further from franchise store pay practices, franchisees may be even less likely
to comply with wage-and-hour law.
These next-generation problems are hardly insurmountable. But they may
require going outside of wage-and-hour laws to establish a duty to monitor
illegal payroll practices, notwithstanding joint-employer status.
CONCLUSION
The NYAG’s Domino’s suit marks an important milestone in protecting
labor standards in the fast food industry. Its wage-and-hour-law claim may
guide future courts’ joint-employer analysis in the context of fast food
franchisors. But the analysis offered in this Essay suggests that its most
important impacts may lie elsewhere—in its demonstration of franchisee
dependence and its use of fraud and franchise laws to hold franchisors
accountable without the need to determine joint-employer status.
The suit’s rich factual record shows that the judicial assumption that
franchise agreements are arms-length is overdue for reconsideration. The
78 Control over employment records is a factor in the traditional test to identify a master–servant
relationship, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(g) (AM. LAW INST. 1958), and is
used in a variety of employment laws, including the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Title VII. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (applying the common
law agency test to statutes that do not define the employment relationship or “giv[e] specific guidance
on the . . . meaning” of the term “employee”); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells,
538 U.S. 440, 444-51 (2003) (following Darden by applying the common law agency test to the definition
of “employee” in the ADA). Title VII uses the same definition of “employee” as the ADA. See 29
U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2012) (defining “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer”).
79 Domino’s alleges that it has already done this by restricting access to the Payroll Report for
franchisees in New York State. Memorandum in Opposition to Verified Petition, supra note 29, at 13.
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myth of the franchisee as an independent entrepreneur is demonstrably false,
empowers a legal strategy of misdirection by franchisors, and has led courts
to disregard franchisors’ indirect supervision of franchisee employees. Further
factual development in this and similar cases may lead courts to reject this
assumption and with it, the conflation of supervisory control and quality
control urged by franchisors in these suits.
Regardless of the near-future outcomes of wage-and-hour litigation
against franchisors, however, franchisors are likely to respond by
restructuring the franchise relationship in ways that will insulate them from
liability without removing the perverse incentives for franchisees to violate
the law.80 This suggests the need to impose a duty on franchisors independent
of joint-employer status.
The NYAG’s Domino’s suit offers franchise law as a plausible route to do
this. Legislatures have previously used franchise law to address specific
opportunistic behavior by franchisors.81 Fast food franchisees’ dependence on
franchisors supports the imposition of a duty for fast food franchisors to
exercise reasonable care to train franchisees about the requirements of
wage-and-hour laws, monitor their payroll practices, and remedy violations
of wage-and-hour laws in franchise stores as a condition of franchising.82
Establishing a baseline duty to prevent and redress wage-and-hour law
violations through franchise law would address the present perverse incentives
for franchisees to violate the law without requiring a joint-employer
determination. This solution is available to the federal government and to all
states that regulate franchisors. Since courts typically reject monitoring as
evidence of supervisory control, if the law specifically requires such
80 A similar franchisor response is likely in response to recent successful claims against McDonald’s
under an ostensible agency theory. In Ochoa and Salazar, while rejecting plaintiffs’ joint-employer theory
under wage-and-hour law, the courts nonetheless denied summary judgment on their claim that
McDonald’s was jointly liable under the ostensible agency theory under which plaintiffs believed
that the franchisees were McDonald’s true agents. Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228,
1239-40 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 14-02096, 2016 WL 4394165, at
*13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016) (denying motion for summary judgment on similar ostensible agency
theory). McDonald’s recently agreed to pay $3.75 million to resolve Ochoa, even as it continues to
litigate Salazar. See Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 3:14-02098, 2016 BL 378649 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
14, 2016) (granting approval of the class settlement agreement); Robert Iafolla, McDonald’s Fights a
Second Class Action Brought by Franchise Workers, REUTERS LEGAL (Nov. 22, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-employment-mcdonalds-idUSL1N1DN0GL [https://perma.cc/
DC6L-WVBD]. McDonald’s and other franchisors are likely to react to these and future ostensible
agency theory claims by requiring franchisees to instruct store employees that they are not
employees of the franchisor.
81 For example, Congress in 1978 passed the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act to limit the
grounds on which motor fuel franchisors could terminate the franchise agreement and establish
procedural protections for franchisees. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2802–2804 (2012).
82 This mirrors the injunctive remedy sought in the NYAG’s Domino’s suit. Amended
Memorandum of Law in Support of Verified Petition, supra note 77, at 43.
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monitoring, this approach is also unlikely to increase franchisor liability in
unforeseen ways.83
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83 See Moreau v. Air Fr., 356 F.3d 942, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting mandated safety
trainings as evidence of joint employment where an airline was legally required to provide such
trainings “to ensure compliance with applicable safety regulations”). Nor would joint liability
necessarily increase costs for franchisors. As Chief Judge Easterbrook observed in Reyes, a business
contracting with “fly-by-night” operators can reduce liability “either [by] deal[ing] only with other
substantial businesses or hold[ing] back enough on the contract to ensure that workers have been
paid in full.” 495 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2007). In response to a change in franchise law, requiring
franchisors to remedy franchisee wage-and-hour law violations, franchisors could include holdbacks
for labor performance—common in the construction industry—as a standard franchise agreement
term. Id. at 409.

